Richard Mears

Executive Director

Maine Community Policing Institute

46 University Drive · Augusta, Maine04330

(207) 621-3480 / (207) 621-3301 (Fax)

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to review the status of Mass Transportation in the United States with particular focus on the role of law enforcement agencies assigned to security functions. Part of the observations and identification of responsibilities identified within this article are based on conference materials distributed in Tel Aviv, Israel on December 2-4, 2002 on airliner/airport security. (1) Additional information and recommendations are a product of a “focus Group meeting held in Massachusetts(2) with invited experts from the transportation security and law enforcement environments within the United States. The information in this report represents the opinions of the author and is provided to the reader for consideration in the development of security measures.

BACKGROUND

After September 11, 2001(9/11) the United States and indeed, the international community embarked on a massive global effort to enhance airport security. Prior to the 9/11 incident, threats had emerged concerning terrorist plots to seize aircraft yet there was no specific target that had been identified according to subsequent 9/11 reports commissioned by the United States Congress. The response to 9/11 was staggering in the scope of world activities. Virtually all airports in the United States were shut down until a security plan could be developed and set in place to prevent any additional attacks on American infrastructure via the commandeering of an American or foreign aircraft.

The security plan that emerged from that shutdown included the use of American law enforcement and United States Military within the United States as mechanisms of security screening for the short term and the eventual development of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). TSA would become a permanent part of the mass transportation security apparatus. Over a short period of time the U.S. Military component of security was removed from the security picture and American Law Enforcement became a more permanent part of the structure. There was a major, yet perhaps faulty assumption, made in the plan to secure American airports by law enforcement representatives. That assumption was that the police experience translated into an equivalent experiential base in “security functions”. This resulted in the police being assigned a major role in the protection of airports and the flying public without sufficient analysis of the training needs attendant to such duties. In short, it was presumed that police officers would know what to look for when confronting a terrorist plot and/or attempt. The police assigned to the transportation facilities generally had no specific training in terrorist modus operandi, or the techniques employed in a terrorist attack. The first major airport to undertake such a training program in the United States was probably the Massachusetts Transit Authority (Massport) who acquired significant financial resources to assess its facilities security and who in turn chose a former representative of El Al airlines to advise them on how to secure the airport and develop the training needs for police officers assigned to the function. (3)

During the early summer of 2002, representatives of the Maine Community Policing Institute (MCPI) developed a proposal to improve the security status in Maine airports by sending a State of Maine delegation to Israel to seek assistance from the Israeli Security Agency on the subject of transportation security and asset protection.(4)

Professor Richard Mears of MCPI and the University of Maine at Augusta(5) undertook steps to bring the proposal to fruition. The original idea was to identify a team of approximately twelve representatives from the state of Maine who were involved in airport security or airport management and send them to Israel for a two-week period of “emersion” training on both airliner/airport security and techniques of defense against terrorist attacks.

In order to accomplish such a project the office of the Governor of Maine would have be involved and make an official request of the Israeli government. In August 2002, Governor Angus King met with the Israeli Consul General (6) and Professor Mears to discuss the proposal. As a result of the meeting the Consul General conveyed the proposal to his government with a favorable recommendation.

In late October 2002, Professor Mears was contacted by the Consul General and informed that the original proposal had been rejected by the Israeli Government because of the large number of similar request coming in from other governments around the world. As an alternative, the it was proposed that a delegation of up to four Maine representatives attend a conference on airliner/airport security that would be hosted by the Israeli Security Agency. Professor Mears was also informed that there would be approximately 25-30 delegations from other countries invited to attend the conference. Professor Mears was asked to select the attendees from Maine on behalf of Governor King who also appointed him as the project manager. (7)

PROJECT GOALS

The goals of the project were:

1. To review airliner/airport security measures and doctrines of EL AL Airlines and the Israeli Security Agency (ISA) who are charged with providing security to El AL;

2. To determine techniques of security that could be employed in The United States and within the parameters of cultural sensitivities of the American public and Democratic legal principles;

3. To assess strength and weaknesses of current airliner/airport security measures against the backdrop of what was learned at the conference;

4. To establish a network of contacts with worldwide organizations charged with the same mission of security; and

5. To develop an understanding of the mindset of terrorists who have attacked mechanisms of mass transportation over the last twenty years.

TRAVEL OBSERVATIONS

Citizens of the United States are accustomed to traveling within the confines of this country relatively unchallenged. However, one cannot even buy airline tickets to Israel without being asked the reason for ones travel into the country. Members of the delegation were asked to provide dates of birth, social security numbers, and ultimate destinations upon purchase of airline tickets.

Israeli airline security apparatus starts at the terminal in the country of origin. The MCPI delegation traveled via JFK international airport and at the El Al Airline gate was briefly stopped by members of the security detail who inquired about the purpose of our travel. MCPI delegates were asked to produce passports and tickets and an immediate problem surfaced. Two members of the delegation had very recently acquired a passport for this specific trip and had not possessed a previous passport. They were questioned in detail about the nature of their business in spite of their being able to produce adequate police documents and correspondence from the ISA.(8) Upon arrival in Israel the plane was parked away from the physical terminal and all passengers efficiently bussed to the terminal. Processing at the arrival terminal was expeditious for all passengers.

ISRAELI SECURITY AGENCY STRUCTURE

The Israeli Security Agency was developed in 1972 with the following functions identified as part of its missions:

VIP protection

Protection of certain regulated bodies

Protection of government institutions abroad

Prevention of the smuggling of explosives

Prevention of Marine intrusions

Protection of classified information

Protection of Embassies

Protection of Airline facilities

ISA seeks traits in their agents that include: Prior Military, Teamwork, Careful selection, and Controlled (disciplined) behavior. It is with these skills that the agents begin their training. The training program for the agents is both physically and mentally challenging and basic training is some eight weeks in duration. This basic training is in addition to the prior military training the candidate possesses. The philosophical foundation of the training is that the agent is trained to be “a hunter, not a fisherman”. This means they are trained to seek out the problem and confront it before it becomes a crisis and to seek out any attackers and confront them before casualties mount. (9) These agents are not trained as police officers; they are trained as security officers.

This distinction implies a focus away from criminal matters with more attention being paid to safety and security with specific attention being paid to the agents “protected environment”.

Agents are taught techniques of constant evaluation, assessment and dynamic change based on the evolution of the environment they are working. They are conditioned to shift from docile behavior to “immediate action with great force”. This phrase should be interpreted to mean that ISA agents respond to an attack by immediately going into an offensive mode and taking the battle to the opponent. This represents a significant strategy in regard to the protection of life and the use of force in the event of a terrorist incident. It is based on the assumption that such action saves lives. (10) Finally, agents are constantly retraining and evaluating training based on real world events as a means to stay alert and responsive.

During the course of the conference the ISA provided an illustration of training at Tel Aviv airport that demonstrated the levels of security they employ and the specific job functions of agents. This information may be put to quick use in the development of training programs in the United States. These techniques are not detailed in this report in the interest of brevity but are somewhat summarized in part as recommendations for Maine training considerations. (11)

CURRENTSTATE OF AIRPORT SECURITY USA

It was the consensus of the Maine Community Policing Institute delegation that security in the United States is best characterized as in its “developmental” stage. The Congress of the United States has authorized, and in some cases mandated, a number of actions in response to the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. The authorization of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is but one example. Since 9/11/01 the United States and other countries have developed multiple strategies to make air travel safer, yet MCPI suggested that they may not prevent another dynamic attack by terrorist. (12) ( we have intentionally omitted areas of current vulnerability in this report in the interest of security) The MCPI report was based on the respective expertise of the “Focus Group” and without the benefit of inside information concerning the plans of action of either TSA or collective State actions regarding airliner/airport security. Notwithstanding this limitation, MCPI staff identified shortcomings as they perceived them in hopes that, at least in the United States, counter measures may be able to pre-empt any future attack by “target hardening” our facilities and we may apply this information to other mode of mass transportation.

At the time of the original report MCPI identified a worldwide deficiency in the intelligence gathering capabilities of both governments and airport facilities. This deficiency gap is getting smaller, yet there remains a great deal of work to be done. This gap allows the enemy the luxury of literally getting the first opportunity in any event if not detected in time. This issue will present the constant dilemma of security verses public relations especially in the United States and other democratic forms of government throughout the world. It was suggested that a major cultural attitude change in the area of “privacy” would be necessary if we intend to secure mass travel. In addition, as the world undertook measures to provide such a level of security, we must assume that the terrorist is going to change targets as we make opportunities less available in the airline industry. This prediction was clearly reinforced via the Madrid, Spain train bombing. The focus group predicted a “target shift” by terrorist away from commercial airlines with a passenger focus to commercial and private airlines with a limited business focus and/or other modes of transportation. Examples of this include charter flights and flights without passengers in the normal sense. The Israeli’s have also implied that their security measures were, and are, a product of the incident/response mode of attack. That means that after every incident they have reevaluated and ratcheted up security as a response. That mode of operation will continue until we develop sufficient intelligence techniques to be ahead of the attacker in all cases. This will quite likely be impossible in a democratic society.

Security principles of 2005 and beyond should consider emulation and replication of those currently in place within the context of the ISA practice. The philosophy, doctrines and strategies suggested include the following:

1. Protect life not property;

2. Employment of threat modeling profiles;

3. Cooperation of all aspects of security and organizations;

4. Strike a balance between technology and manpower;

5. Develop security based on the concentric ring principle;

6. Provide physical protection means for all facilities;

7. Insure adequate background checks of all peoples having access to facilities regardless of employer;

8. Provide passenger screening based on “focus” groups and not random checks;

9. Controlled access to all major transportation modes based on a series of checks and balances; and

10. Employ new technologies of physical security in airport construction.

11. Identify and prioritize critical infrastructure (13)

MCPI also noted that in addition to TSA facilities management, there existed a glaring problem in the utilization of physical protection at the airports in the United States and in the event an attack occurs. That deficiency occurs in the placement of Law Enforcement resources.

The law enforcement community is currently the sole source of protection and action in the event of an attack in the United States. The integration between TSA and law enforcement needs significant improvement and indeed law enforcement needs to redefine its role in proactive physical security. All of the Focus Group attendees were experienced law enforcement officers and can be characterized as frequent fliers within the USA. They conclude that:

• Law enforcement needed a significant attitude readjustment regarding its role in security and that it needed to be trained to a higher level of activity in order to be able to respond to an attack.

• They saw too many “actively retired” police officers being assigned the role of security without proper training or physical conditioning. (part of this problem can be attributed to contractual obligations of the workforce. As the ISA points out, its agents must be trained to respond to an attack with great force.)

• This assignment implied many hours of boredom and inactivity wherein an agent must be capable of immediate diametric change in mode to “take the attack to the attacker”.

• The probabilities are high that there will be no “readily available reinforcements” immediately accessible in the event an attack takes place in any transportation mode beyond the officer(s) assigned to the detail post.

• The police must therefore be viewed as the only means of protection and be prepared to confront multiple attackers alone. Instant response will be the only mechanism that will save lives. Therefore, the officer’s traits must be such that they will be willing to self-sacrifice in the event of an attack.

LESSONS LEARNED

As previously indicated, this report was not intended to detail all the materials presented at the conference or the subsequent Focus group meeting. As a summary we would indicate that the lessons learned by the conference are listed as follows:

1. The USA airport and mass transportation facilities are terribly under-funded and are probably unable to respond to a terrorist attack now or in the near future. (The Focus Group was convinced there will be more attacks. The prediction was made that there would be more attacks with modifications of modus operandi and on different modes of transportation);

2. Terrorism can be combated with the proper mindset and resource balance and the active inclusion of the traveling public in the watch for suspicious activity;

3. Attacks of the 9/11 natures will occur again and this is a long-term problem

that will span many generations;

4. Networking internationally may be the only successful way to prevent incidences of mass suicide attack; (14)

5. Law enforcement agencies must begin to work with airport management within their jurisdictions to assess and improve airport physical protection as part of their security function; and

6. Law enforcement agencies must work with airport management staff within their jurisdictions to improve passenger-screening systems that comport with the constraints of the Constitution’s Bill of Rights yet balance the right of society for protection.

These summations being identified, the Maine Community Policing Institute staff and the delegation suggested development of an immediate training program oriented exclusively toward police officers assigned to airport facilities in the United States that may identify many of the techniques learned from a combination of ; the Israeli Security Agency, the 9/11 incident and subsequent investigations, and the ISA conference. MCPI has since worked with TSA representatives in Maine, former El Al Airline security agents currently in private security ventures and other law enforcement agents (16) to systematically develop a strategy for the delivery of such training and the integration of training between agencies. The outcome was the developement a comprehensive training program that is focused on law enforcement expertise and responsibilities. This training includes modules regarding the following:

Constitutional law and Search and Seizure Principles

Use of Force dynamics

Utilization of Community Policing Principles to engage citizen participation

Physical conditioning of law enforcement officers

Criteria for transportation detail assignment

Aggressor methods of operation

Explosives recognition

Terrorist mindset

Document identification and verification skills

Predictive behavior and future terrorist metamorphosis

Specific definition of the protected environment

As national and international efforts to combat terrorism build momentum it will become more difficult for a terrorist individual or organization to perpetrate an attack on protected environments provided we are capable of clearly defining those environments and thus not squander resources on non-critical resources. We warn our institutional leadership not to take comfort in their success to date. As they succeed (anti-terrorism efforts) the terrorist will displace their activities to new environments with lesser-developed schemes of protection yet of strategic value. This is a war where all police in all governments are now the “front line of defense”. This paradigm shift in police functions will necessarily result in new forms of international cooperation in law enforcement heretofore unimaginable. Jurisdictions, arrest authority, investigative information sharing, and basic skill sets will all be affected. Mere technology alone will be unable to provide citizens with adequate protection because this war will be both high and low tech in nature. Balance between human and technological skills will be absolutely essential if we are to succeed. In the final analysis we need to combine people, technology and awareness of the public, in our efforts to insure safety. Our conclusion is that there are skill sets, some unique and some common, that all the traveling public needs to possess in order to maximize safe travel.

Reference Notes:

1. Conference was hosted by the Protection and Security Division of the Israeli Security Agency, December 2-4, 2002

2. Focus Group meeting included representatives of the following organizations; Maine Community Policing Institute, Maine State Police, Bangor, Maine Police Department,

MassachusettsState Police, New York Regional Community Policing Institute, Pennsylvania Regional Community Policing Institute, United States Air Force, Metro- Dade Miami Police Department, Chicago Police Department, Chameleon Group LLC.

The focus group met at LoganInternationalAirport from April 13-15, 2003 to discuss the functions of law enforcement representatives assigned to Airport Security in the United States.

3. Major Tom Robbins (Currently Superintendent of the MassachusettsState police) headed up this project with Sgt. Peter DiDominica assisting. Raffi Ran was the security consultant assisting in the security assessment. This assessment occurred sometime in 2001-2002 prior to the Focus Group Meeting.

4. This proposal was a collaboration between MCPI and a security consultant with expertise in Middle-east political history and the emergence of terrorism activities in the region. He has been a consultant and trainer for MCPI since the 9/11 incident. This relationship assisted us in the development of the proposal for assistance from Israel. Portland, Maine was a point of origin for Mohamed Atta, a key figure in the 9/11 attack strategy.

5. The Maine Community Policing Institute (MCPI) is a Law Enforcement Training entity funded by the State of Maine and the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing. MCPI staff have received significant training on the subject of anti-terrorism and possess operational expertise in the protection of military assets.

6. Consul General Shlomo resides in the Boston office of the Israeli Consulate and was

instrumental in assisting MCPI staff in the development of this project.

7. Those selected included Professor Richard Mears, Project Manager; Colonel Michael Sperry, Chief of the Maine State Police; Lt. Timothy Reid, Bangor Police Department; and Melvin Tucker, Special Projects Manager, MCPI and retired Chief of Police, Tallahassee, Florida. Professor Mears is the Executive Director of the institute and the retired Deputy Chief of Police from BrunswickMaine. He has expertise in police training, tactical operations, and counter-terrorism training.

8. It was later learned at the conference that a new passport is a “warning indicator” for ISA. After some discussion and review by ISA superiors the delegation was allowed to proceed through the gateway and asked to wait in a VIP reception area for boarding time.

9. It’s interesting to note that the ISA has a profile of their agents that they would define as;

Determined, Brave, Action oriented, Tough, Pro-active. They recruit candidates for this assignment by using this profile as a starting point. A lesson American law enforcement needs emulate.

10. This strategy was effectively demonstrated on July 4, 2002 at the Los Angeles international airport when the facility was attacked on July 4^th in spite of an elevated security alert issued by the Department of Homeland Security and the inaction of police officers assigned to the detail.

11. MCPI prepared an Executive Brief for the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Policing as an end product of this project.

12. The tactics change in terrorist tactics in Madrid is an example and the prediction of such a change was discussed amongst the focus group participants. The police community use a term called “displacement” which simply means that as you harden a target in one location or profile you will force the offender to seek a less protected target as an alternative. This application holds significant value in preparing for terrorist attacks in the future.

13. similar proposals were identified by Michael Chertoff, Director of Homeland Security via a radio speech presented by National Public Radio on or about August 10,2005

14. Clearly define the “protected environment” that emerges from the infrastructure assessment.

15. The London, England remarkably reinforced this prediction in August 2005 after it was publicly declared there was no credible threat of imminent attack.

16. Most notable the Chicago Police Department security details at O’hare airport and Logan airport